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VOLUME 5 SPRING, 1972 NUMBER 2
EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY IN A
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY
EARL M. CURRY, JR.*
In the right to eat the bread. .. which his own hand
earns, he [the Negro] is my equal and the equal of
Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.'
T HE U.S. RIOT COMMISSION 'REPORT 2 states in the introductory para-
graph of its recommendations for national action in the area of
employment that, "Unemployment and underemployment are among the
persistent and serious grievances of disadvantaged minorities. The perva-
sive effect of these conditions on the racial ghetto is inextricably linked
to the problems of civil disorder."' 3 It seems to be a simple fact of life
that the lack of jobs, or jobs above a minimal level, is one of the
underlying causes of the civil disorder we have experienced in the recent
past. We may expect these difficulties to continue to plague our nation
until the underprivileged have employment opportunities equal to those
of white America.
At the time of his death, the late Dr. Martin Luther King was
moving his Southern Christian Leadership Conference, through Operation
Breadbasket, in the direction of bringing pressure to bear on the economic
problems of the poor. Dr. King had concluded that the economic problems
of the poor were the most serious problems faced by the Negro com-
munity. As statistics show, 4 the unemployment rate for Negroes exceeds
that of whites by about 50 per cent.5
* B.S., West Virginia University, M.Ret. University of Pittsburgh, J.D., West Virginia
University, LL.M., New York University, Associate Professor of Law, The University
of Akron.
1 Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln-Douglas Debates, Aug., 1858.
2 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Bantam ed. 1968).
31d. at 413.
4 See Olson, Employment Discrimination Litigation: New Priorities In the Struggle
For Black Equality, 6 HARv. Csv. RsGrrs-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 20 (1971): Fisher, Labor
and the Economy, 1969, 93 Mo. LABOR REv. 30, 31 (Table 1) (1970).
5 Fisher, supra note 4, at 30.
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The economic boycott has proven to be one of the most effective
means of achieving civil rights.6 The reason that the boycott has been
effective is readily understandable if one considers that minority groups
have, until recently, received little support from other segments of society.
Government agencies, as well as the courts, have in the past ignored the
economic problems of minorities. Labor unions, particularly the trade
unions, have displayed outright hostility towards their efforts to obtainjobs. It is to be expected, then, that minorities would turn to "self-help"
devices to achieve for themselves employment opportunity when other
means are closed to them. One of the most controversial aspects of the
use of the economic boycott has been the demand made for quotas or
proporticnal hiring of minority persons in numbers corresponding to
their percentage of the overall work force.
The purposes of this article are first, to look at the rights of Negroes, 7
under law, to bring economic pressure to bear for employment equality,
including the demand for a quota, and secondly to see how that law is
satisfying today's social needs. To achieve this latter purpose, perhaps we
must ask whether our society can afford to be legally color-blind? We
shall look first to the private self-help devices that have been used by
minorities, and then to one area of governmental intervention that has
dealt directly with minority employment and the use of quotas or goals
to achieve an acceptable balance of minority personnel within a given
industry. From this study it is hoped that we can determine the legal
limits of demands for proportional hiring both of the private "self-help"
variety and those promulgated by government.
I. EARLY CASES
A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnsons was the first case to arise in the
United States over the right of Negroes to picket for employment
opportunity. The case arose in New York during the Depression in 1934.
In that action the plaintiff, whose store was located in Harlem, was
6 Dr. King rose to public prominence as a result of the Montgomery bus boycott.Civil rights lawyer Charles Morgan Jr. once commented that the difference betweenthe racial attitudes of Birmingham, Alabama and Atlanta, Georgia was a result of thenature of the predominant industry in each of the two cities--one, industrial consumer
orientated; the other, individual consumer orientated. As Mr. Morgan expressed it, theNegro in Birmingham could not say to his wife, "Don't buy any U.S. Steel today,because I can't work there," but the Negro in Atlanta could say to his wife, "Don'tbuy any Coca-Cola today." See Comment, The Consumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L. REv.
226 (1971).
7 This of course applies to all minorities. Department of Labor data refer to all races
other than white. Negroes make up about 92 per cent of races other than white. Seesupra note 4. For a comprehensive study of the racial policies of American industry
see WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE & COMMERCE, STUDiEs OF NEGRO EMPLOYMENT
Vol. I-V (U. Pa. Press 1970-71).
8 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Spec. Term. N.Y.C. 1934) [hereinafter cited as
Beck].
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granted an injunction pendente lite restraining the Negro defendants
from picketing the store. The court granted the injunction notwith-
standing the fact that the picketing was peaceful and that the assertions
in the signs carried by the pickets were truthful. The signs contained
the following assertions:
A. S. Beck does not employ 50 per cent Negroes.
Stay Out. Do not buy here.
An Appeal. Why spend your money where you
can't work? This is foolish. Stay out.
Citizens League for Fair Play.
An Appeal. Don't buy from this store.
Negro serving here is a porter not a clerk.
Stay out. Citizens League for Fair Play.9
The court characterized the dispute as a racial and not a labor
dispute, and even though it was the result of an understandable desire on
the part of those picketing that the stores in neighborhoods where they
spent their money employ Negroes, the court was of the opinion that
the objective sought did not justify the means used.
The next year, 1935, in the case of Green v. Samuelson,'
0 the
Supreme Court of Maryland uphcld an injunction against a group of
Negroes who picketed to replace white clerks by Negroes. The Maryland
court refused to accept the defendant's contention that the case was akin
to a labor dispute inasmuch as it was their purpose to secure employment
for members of the Negro race and improve its condition. The court did
concede that while the Negroes could not picket, they could organize,
hold public meetings, and use personal solicitation to persuade white
employers to employ Negroes. The Maryland court noted that New York
had reached the same conclusion in the Beck case. The Beck case
provoked a number of law review comments. The most critical of them
appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review." It stated:
[T]he impossibility of fitting the situation into the category of a labor
dispute should not necessitate such a result. There may well be
considerations in favor of giving such privileges to the Negro race
quite as compelling as those which have brought about the liberaliza-
tion of the judicial attitude toward labor. In that field, the modern
tendency to permit direct action represents a hard-won advance from
the early decisions condemning all combinations for common action
against employers as criminal conspiracies. The court in the instant
case dismissed the problem of underlying social policy by alluding
briefly to potential race conflicts. While it may be conceded that such
conflicts are to be discouraged, this reason for denying the picketing
privilege is not altogether persuasive. Some degree of violence seems
9 Id. at 364-65.
10 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Green).
1183 U. OF PA. L. REV. 383 (1935).
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to be an inevitable concomitant of any self-enforced improvement inthe lot of previously subjected groups, as the turbulence of manylabor disputes will bear witness. The alternative of abandoning all
attempts at progress is scarcely preferable. There appear to be morebasic factors which the court overlooked. The essential purposebehind the liberal attitude toward labor would seem to be the
advisability of raising living standards and ultimately reducingthe sociological and economic burdens upon the community as a
whole which accompany the subjugation of any large group therein.The economic progress of the Negro race should, for this same
reason, be a proper subject of community concern. A contrarydecision in the principal case would have given impetus to thedevelopment of the Negro in segregated districts by obliging white
employers, if they remained in the district in competition with Negro
stores, to employ Negro help. 12
Despite the dated language in referring to "segregated districts,"
which may not be so dated in view of our own de facto segregation
today, the criticism is still valid. Other law reviews agreed with thedecision upon the dual basis that: (1) to allow the picketing might cause
racial riots; and (2) the lack of any public policy favoring racial privileges
comparable to the public policy favoring labor demands. 13
II. A NEW DAY-THE NEW NEGRO ALLIANCE CASE
In 1938, four years after the Beck case, the United States SupremeCourt in a case on certiorari from the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that there was a labor dispute within the meaning ofSection 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 14 when a Negro social actiongroup that called itself the New Negro Alliance picketed a grocery store
to persuade the store to hire Negro clerks.15 In this case, the organization
requested the company to adopt a policy of employing Negro clerksin the course of personnel changes in their stores located in Negro
neighborhoods which were patronized largely by Negroes.
12 Id. at 384.
1
3 See 35 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1935); 48 H~Av. L. REV. 691 (1935).
14 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113 (1965) Section 113 states in part:(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when thecase involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, oroccupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; ... or when the caseinvolves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute" (as herein-after defined) of "persons participating or interested" therein (as hereinafterdefined). (b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participatingor interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or if, and if heor it... has a direct or indirect interest therein,... (c) The term "labor dispute"includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,....regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation ofemployer and employee.
15 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as New Negro Alliance].
AxRON LAw REviw [Vol. 5:2
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The company ignored the request and one picket, carrying a sign
reading, "Do Your Part! Buy Where You Can Work! No Negroes
Employed Here!"' 6 paraded in front of one of the stores one day, and
threatened to picket two other stores. The Court held that the controversy
came within the definitions of Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
as one arising out of a labor dispute, and that the District Court was
without jurisdiction to grant an injunction against the picketing. The
Court stated that the Act did not concern itself with the backgrounds
or motives of the dispute but rather:
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the
part of persons of any race, color or persuasion, and the removal
of discriminations against them by reason of their race or religious
beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and equity
in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or craft
unions or any form of labor organization or association. Race
discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed more
unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the
ground of union affiliation. There is no justification in the apparent
purposes or the express terms of the Act for limiting its definition of
labor disputes and cases arising therefrom by excluding those which
arise with respect to discrimination in terms and conditions of
employment upon differences of race or color.
17
Unlike -the objectives sought in the Beck and Green cases, the
New Negro Alliance had not made demands that all or even a given
percentage of the clerks be Negro.
The next year, in Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe,'8 a New York
court upheld the right of a Negro organization to picket a theatre in
protest of its policy of not hiring Negro help. The state court compared
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the
New Negro Alliance case to New York's counterpart of Norris-LaGuardia
and found that the state statute did not apply in this case since the
defendants were not included within the classes defined under the state
law.' 9 The picketers carried placards reading: "Do not patronize this
Theatre, they refuse to employ Negro help. Negro Youth Association of
Corona, 100-13 Northern Boulevard, Corona, New York."
20
The New York Supreme Court, relying on New York case law
upholding picketing 2 and the Supreme Court's holding in New Negro
16 Id. at 557.
17 Id. at 561.
18 171 Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
19 Id. at 281, 12 N.Y.S. 2d at 402.
20Id. at 282, 12 N.Y.S. 2d at 402.
21 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927).
Spring, 19721
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Alliance that the purpose of the picketing was lawful, denied the motion
for an injunction stating that:
[In the absence of proof of misconduct, no relief should be granted,
as "The right of an individual or group of individuals to protest in apeaceful manner against injustice or oppression, actual or merely
fancied, is one to be cherished and not to be proscribed in any
well-ordered society." 22
This case was followed by Lilshitz v. Straughn23 in 1941, a decision
which may have been influenced by the line of cases upholding picketing
for a closed shop. The case involved a group calling itself the "Amalga-
mated Labor Association" which demanded that the plaintiff enter into
an agreement with it, the substance of which required the plaintiff to hire
only Negroes who were members of this association. When the plaintiff
refused to do so, the group picketed. The court refused to grant aninjunction on the basis that a labor dispute under New York law was
involved. The injunction was denied, the court noted, notwithstanding the
fact that the association represented only Negro employees and that labor
organized along racial lines might not contribute to the general good.
The court seemed to recognize without so stating, that unions
composed primarily of Negroes were a response to the fact that major
unions practiced discrimination and had no interest in organizing or
helping minority workers. The rise of Negro unions is another example
of the self-help devices that Negroes and other minorities have been
forced to take in attempts to better their economic lot.
Contrary results were reached on basically the same facts by the
California Supreme Court in the case of James v. Marinship Corp.24 This
approach seems to be the correct one to a situation that involvesdiscriminatory demands being made by the picketing group, in that they
were asking for a closed shop while at the same time, they excluded
members on racial grounds. The California court stated that a closed
shop agreement was legal in the state and that a union could use
economic pressure to enforce a demand for one, even where the
employees in the shop did not belong to the union and had no dispute
with their employer. But it did not follow, however;
[Tihat a union may maintain both a closed shop agreement or otherform of labor monopoly together with a closed or partially closed
membership.... An arbitrarily closed or partially closed union isincompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has... attained
a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed shop agree-
22Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, 171 Misc. at 282, 12 N.Y.S. 2d at 403; citingJulie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1934).23216 App. Div. 757, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 193 (2d Dept.), appeal denied, 262 App. Div.849, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 741 (2d Dept. 1941).
2425 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Marinship].
AKRON LAw REvimw [Vol. 5:2
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ments and other forms of collective labor action, such a union
occupies a quasi public position similar to that of a public service
business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It can no longer
claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or
fraternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members
does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental
right to work for a living.25
The situation would, of course, be different if the union were open
to all regardless of race, even if its purpose were to get more jobs for
Negroes. The problem then would be one of convincing the court that
it fairly represented the interests of non-Negroes.
26
The Marinship case is a good example of how the principle of
egalitarianism and the idea that the courts must be color-blind has had
the practical effect of discriminating against minority groups. Superficially
it would seem correct to say that closed or limited membership in a union
is incompatible with a closed shop. But this is precisely the kind of
discrimination that minority groups, particularly Negroes, were faced with
in 1945 and are still facing today to a large extent in trying to obtain
entry into the trade unions. While the closed shop is no longer legal, the
hiring patterns of the construction industry, through the use of the union
hiring halls, have had the same practical effect as the closed shop. It is
little wonder then that minorities have organized their own unions in
response to their being shut out of the predominately white trade unions.
The court, in the Marinship case, by applying ideal standards to one
union (that representing minority persons) when it could not possibly
apply the same standards to others (the major predominately white trade
unions) was in effect discriminating against the minority group persons
involved. The court is saying in effect "thou shall not fight fire with fire."
III. THE ILLEGAL DEMAND
In 1947, in the case of Hughes v. Superior Court,2 a group of Negro
organizations and individuals violated a preliminary injunction issued by
the Superior Court of California forbidding their picketing of a grocery
store. In the proceeding on certiorari the California District Court of
Appeals annulled the contempt citation and held that there was a labor
dispute within the broad meaning of the term, but did not limit the right
to picket labor disputes. In their demands, the Negro groups asked that
the store hire a proportionate number of Negro clerks as replacements
were necessary. The signs the picketers carried stated: "Lucky Won't Hire
25 Id. at 730, 155 P. 2d at 335.
26 Weiner, Negro Picketing for Employment Equality, 13 How. L. Rav. 271, 297
(1967).
27 186 P.2d 756 (Cal. App. 1947).
Spring, 19721
7
Curry: Employment Equality
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Negro Clerks in Proportion to Negro Trade-Don't Patronize. ' 28 The
court, in upholding their right to picket, stated that every argument
that could be made in support of the right of a labor union to picket
could properly be made in support of the right of Negroes to secure
employment equality.
All that we are here holding is that it is in accord with sound public
policy to permit Negroes, a discriminated against, and subjugated
group in our society, to picket to attempt to secure equality in
employment practices from those employers who cater to Negro
patronage. The right is granted not because the picketers are
members of a minority group, but because that minority group is
economically discriminated against, and is attempting to rectify that
condition. Beyond that we do not have to and do not go in this
case. We conclude therefore, that on principle the right to picket
is not limited to labor disputes but may be exercised whenever
the economic interest of the picketers is sufficiently important to
warrant this interference with the rights of those against whom
the picketers are operating. 29
The court made short shrift of the argument that proportional hiring
of Negroes was unlawful:
Such an argument disregards the realities. Carried to its logical
conclusion it would mean that a store whose patronage is entirely
Negro, and where many clerks were hired, by the token hiring of
one Negro, could prevent the picketing of such establishment aimed
at preventing such discrimination and exploitation. Even if it be
assumed that a demand for a mathematical quota, discrimination
being absent, would be an unlawful demand, in the present case
it is the fact that discrimination here, exists that makes what
otherwise, it may be assumed, would be unlawful, lawful. Beyond
that we need not go. 30
The California Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the contempt
judgment with two justices dissenting.3' The court based its decision on
Marinship3 and said that if the store had yielded to the demands, the
resultant policy would be the equivalent of both a closed shop and a
closed union in favor of Negroes. The combination of the two was found
impermissible under California's public policy.
Because race and color are inherent qualities which no degree of
striving or of other qualifications for a particular job could meet,
those persons who are born with such qualities constitute, among
themselves, a closed union which others cannot join. It was just such
28 Id. at 759.
29 Id. at 765.
30 Id. at 766.
31 Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948).
3225 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945).
[Vol. 5:2
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a situation-an arbitrary discrimination upon the basis of race and
color alone, rather than a choice based solely upon individual
qualification for the work to be done-which we condemned in
the Marinship case .... 33
The majority felt that the fact that this demand was for a proportion
of the employees, and not all, did not reduce the unlawfulness of its
purpose, because to the extent of the proportion, the right to work was
dependent on membership in a particular race and not the fitness for the
work. "If petitioners were upheld in their demand then other races, white,
yellow, brown and red, would have equal rights to demand discriminatory
hiring on a racial basis. Yet that is precisely the type of discrimination to
which the petitioners avowedly object."3 4
In a strong dissenting opinion,35 Justice Carter pointed out that the
petitioners were seeking equal treatment, not discrimination, and that in
neighborhoods that were predominantly one race or the other, picketing
for a proportional hiring of members of that race would be just, equitable,
and in accord with sound public policy. In this case the picketers were
picketing a store in a predominantly Negro neighborhood, and the
customers of the store were at least 50 per cent Negro. As he pointed out:
The petitioners by means of peaceful picketing... were seeking to
publicize their grievances to members of their race, and to members
of the white race in sympathy with their long struggle for freedom,
so that economic pressure might be exerted to gain for them equality
in the labor field. They requested only that a proportionate number
of Negro clerks be hired as replacements were necessary. Not that
any white person be fired that they might be hired.36
Justice Traynor thought that the holding of the majority was an
erroneous application of the Marinship case.37 In that case the union
attempted to secure a monopoly of the jobs by a closed union coupled
with a closed shop, but the court held that a union with this monopoly
could not close its membership on racial grounds and simultaneously
enforce a closed shop contract against those it excluded from membership.
He distinguished the Marinship situation from the situation in Hughes on
on the basis that the petitioners were not seeking a monopoly, but only a
share of the jobs they would have had, had there been no discrimination
against them.38 He stated that rules that were developed to limit abuses of
those already in control of the labor market do not apply to persons seeking
to gain entrance 'to that market, as in this case. 39 He then pointed out that:
33 32 Cal.2d at 854, 198 P.2d at 889.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 858, 198 P.2d at 890 (Carter, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 861, 198 P.2d at 894.
37 Id. at 867, 198 P.2d at 895.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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Those racial groups against whom discrimination is practiced may
seek economic equality either by demanding that hiring be done
without reference to race or color or by demanding a certain number
of jobs for members of this group. The majority opinion holds that
economic equality cannot be sought by the second method if
picketing is adopted as a means of attaining that objective. In the
absence of a statute protecting them from discrimination it is not
unreasonable for Negroes to seek economic equality by asking those
in sympathy with their aims to help them secure jobs that may be
opened to them by the enlistment of such aid. In their struggle for
equality the only effective economic weapon Negroes have is the
purchasing power they are able to mobilize to induce employers
to open jobs to them.... There are so few neighborhoods where
Negroes can make effective appeals against discrimination that they
may reasonably regard the seeking of jobs in neighborhoods where
their appeal may be effective the only practical means of combating
discrimination against them. In arbitrating the conflicting interests
of different groups in society courts should not impose ideal
standards on one side when they are powerless to impose similar
standards upon the other.40
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States in a unanimous
decision in Hughes v. Superior Court4' declared that picketing by Negroes
for quotas or proportionate hiring, whether based on a percentage of
Negroes to whites in the neighborhood of the affected business, or on
an arbitrary number, was considered an unlawful object by most states
and was totally outside the protection of either the Norris-LaGuardia
Act4 ' or the National Labor Relations Act.4'
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, attacked the concept
of proportional hiring:
To deny to California the right to ban picketing in the circumstances
of this case would mean that there could be no prohibition of the
pressure of picketing to secure proportional employment on ancestral
grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans
in Milwaukee, of Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San
Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York, and so
on through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations
in various cities."
Thus, under New Negro Alliance, it is legal to picket to require an
employer to hire "some Negroes." Now, under Hughes, that same picket-
40 Id. at 866, 198 P.2d at 895-6.
u1339 U.S. 460 (1950) (Mr. Justice Douglas not participating).
42 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1965).
43 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-168 (1964). See Weiner, supra
note 26.
44 339 U.S. at 464.
[Vol. 5:2
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ing becomes ill2gal when "some Negroes" is translated into a proportional
percentage or an arbitrary number or quota. As one writer has suggested:
[T]here is an implication that somehow it is illegal to be unreasonable
in your demands. Either all your demands are for the "purpose of
furthering equal economic progress" such as in New Negro Alliance,
or asking for discrimination in reverse, and contra to state public
policy, as in Hughes v. Superior Court .... The characterizations
above suffer from the fatal disease of oversimplification; mere artful
drafting of a picket sign or a letter to a prospective employer
should not make the difference between legality or illegality. But
alas, it all too often does. 45
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF HUGHES V. SUPERIOR COURT
Accompanying the increase of civil rights activities in the 1960's
there was an increasing number of suits to enjoin picketing by Negroes
for employment equality. Not only was picketing enjoined, but other
types of activity which were designed to bring pressure to bear on
employers to hire Negroes of the type other courts 46 have allowed, even
when they enjoined picketing, were now forbidden.
In Potomac Electric & Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of CORE
47
the defendant group was enjoined from distributing to the electric
company's customers stamps bearing the words, "We believe in merit
hiring." 48 These stamps were to be affixed to the stub of the bill that was
returned to the company in connection with payment. The electric
company contended that the stamps would make it impossible to use
the stubs in its calculating machines and that the result would be
confusion and havoc in its billing and accounting department. The court
distinguished the case on the facts from New Negro Alliance as not being
a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but said
that even if it were deemed to be a labor dispute it would not bar relief
in that the company could show irreparable or substantial injury and thus
meet the requirements of Norris-LaGuardia for an injunction.49
The following year, 1963, in 'the case of Fair Share Organization
v. Nagdeman & Sons, 50 an Indiana court said that there was no labor
dispute within the meaning of Indiana state law in an action by a
company to enjoin an organization from picketing in an effort to compel
the company to hire Negroes on a proportional basis.
That same year the Florida state courts in Young Adults for
45 Weiner, supra note 26, at 292.
46 Green, 168 Md. 421, 178A. 109 (1935).
47210 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1962).
48 Id. at 419.
49 Id. at 420-2 1.
50 193 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. App. 1963), cert. denied. 379 U.S. 818 (1964).
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Progressive Action, Inc. v. B. & B. Cash Grocery Store, Inc.51 upheld
an injunction against peaceful picketing for better hiring and promotion
policies on the grounds that there was no obligation for the employer
not to discriminate. The pickets had carried signs reading: "Qualified
Negroes Can't Work Here. Don't Buy at B & B"; "Let's Not Buy at
B & B Until We Get Better Jobs."5 2
The group had not asked for proportionate hiring of Negroes,
only that "some Negroes be hired" in jobs other than menial ones.
The case seems to 'be directly in point with New Negro Alliance yet
the court in its one-page opinion avoided the necessity of making
a distinction by failing to cite it. 53 Instead, the court 'based its decision
on Van Zandt v. McKee.5 4
The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, includes the
right to work and earn an honest living; but it does not include
the right to work for any particular individual without the latter's
consent. One man's right to work stops short of the other fellow's
right not to hire him.55
In a group of three cases 56 growing out of a sit-in protest against
a St. Louis bank for the purpose of requiring the bank to hire four
Negroes within two weeks, the courts held that the demand was a violation
of the state's Fair Employment Practices Act 57 and that a restraining
order was not invalid as being in conflict with the preempted field of the
Labor Management Relations Act.58 Both of the federal district courts
that heard these cases 59 made the assumption that the demand to hire
four Negroes made by the Negro group was a violation of the Missouri
Fair Employment Practices Act. In Ford v. Boeger the court stated:
"The petitioners were not protesting the Bank's discriminatory hiring
policy, but were trying to force the Bank to hire four negroes which is
a discriminatory practice. [Citing the Missouri Fair Employment Practices
Act.]" 60 In In re Curtis' Petition, the court distinguished the fact
51 151 So.2d 877 (Fla. App.), appeal dismissed, 157 So.2d 809 (Fla. App. 1963).
52 151 So.2d at 877.
53 It is of course impossible to tell how this error came about, but nevertheless,
someone made a mistake.
54 202 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1953).
55 Id.
5In re Curtis' Petition, 240 F. Supp. 475 (E. D. Mo. 1965); Ford v. Boeger, 236F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1964); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. App. 1964).
57 Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 296.010-.070 (1965).
5847 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113 (1965).59 In re Curtis' Petition, 240 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Ford v. Boeger, 236
F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Ford].
60 236 F. Supp. at 838.
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situation from the New Negro Alliance case on the basis of the lawfulness
of the demand made.
In that case a lawful demand was made. In this case the demand
of CORE to hire four Negroes within two weeks flies in the face of
[the Missouri Fair Employment Practices Act].
By their demand, claiming to seek compliance with the Act, the
petitioners also sought its violation. What might otherwise be a labor
dispute between a union and an employer ceases to be a "bona fide
labor dispute" when an unlawful demand is made.
61
The statute involved is couched in langauge that makes it unlawful
to refuse to hire someone because of race, but it does not speak in terms
of discrimination in favor of racial minorities.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice:
(1) For any employer, because of race, creed, color, religion, national
origin, or ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or
to bar or to discharge from employment such individual, or to
discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.
62
These courts are again taking what might be called a "color-blind"
approach to the Missouri statute, by saying that the statute prohibits not
only discrimination against persons on the basis of race, but also that it
prohibits discrimination in favor of minority persons as well. By the act
of trying to force the bank to hire four Negroes CORE was not only
objecting to the bank's discriminatory policies, which was the reason for
the demand of course, but they were also resorting to one of the few
self-help devices available to them in an attempt to get tangible results-
jobs. A more appropriate action so far as the court was concerned would
have been an economic boycott through the use of pickets. Even here,
however, a legal demand for a given number of jobs, could not have been
made, no matter how reasonable that demand might have been. This
would be true even though the demand represented a proportionate
number of their race in the total workforce or as customers of the bank.
CORE could have, however, made a demand that a "reasonable" number
of Negroes be hired. In the Ford case the court stated that the sit-in was
not protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 since the illegal demand to
hire a specific number of persons was preferential treatment which made
the Act inapplicable.63 The Act does expressly provide that Title VII does
not require the granting of preferential treatment to any individual upon
61240 F. Supp. at 481.
62 Mo. STAT. ANN. § 296.020(1) (1965).
63 236 F. Supp. at 841.
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the basis of quotas.64 The literal language of this section, however, does
not preclude the granting of such preference, it merely states that the Act
does not impose such a duty. In United States v. IBEW, Local 38,65 the
Sixth Circuit held that the Act did not ban affirmative relief.
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative relief
authorization... are read in context with § 2000e-2(j), we believe
that section [703(j)] cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative
relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination resulting
from present practices (neutral on their face) which have the
practical effect of continuing past injustices. Any other interpretation
would allow complete nullification of the stated purposes of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.66
The court found that the facts of the Ford case were very similar to
those in Potomac Electric & Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of
CORE,67 and that there was not -a labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia
for the same reasons.
In the Illinois case of Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organi-
zation,68 a Negro organization asked a laundry company to hire eight
Negro drivers for their routes, and upon refusal of the request picketed
the establishment. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the injunction
granted without a hearing was too broad. In this case the specific number
of eight was arrived at as the result of a survey of the laundry company's
delivery routes to determine which routes primarily served Negro
customers. This survey was made in an effort to cooperate with the
laundry company after they had expressed a fear of losing business in
white neighborhoods if they employed Negro drivers on these routes.
Nevertheless, the court stated that the request to hire any specific number
of persons of a given race was still an illegal demand for a quota. 69 The
court said that an injunction could restrain only the demand for a quota
and could not prohibit peaceful picketing, demonstrations, or boycotts
64 Section 703 (j) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides:
(j) Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer,
.to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because
of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer.... in comparison with the total number orpercentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex or national origin in anycommunity, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in
any community, State, section, or other area.
65 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970).
66 Id. at 149-50; See also Note, The Philadelphia Plan: Remedial Racial Classification
In Employment, 58 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1213-18 (1970).
67210 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1962).
68 55 Ill. App. 2d 406, 204 N.E.2d 589 (1965).
69 Id. at 409, 204 N.E.2d at 592.
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for any purpose. 70 On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, 71 the court
affirmed the decision stating that a hearing on the issue was especially
important on the facts in the case. The court went on to say that if the
purpose of the defendant organization's activity was to force the laundry
to hire a quota of Negro drivers, then under the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Act 72 and the federal Civil Rights Act 73 injunctive relief would
be proper. But if their purpose was not to demand a quota, but simply to
protest discriminatory hiring practices, then their peaceful picketing was
encouraged by that same legislation.
The Illinois Court, in this case, followed the orthodox view that
quota requests are illegal. This court, as had others, took the view
that the state and federal statutes lay down a requirement of "color-
blindness." This policy of color-blindness was to be applied in such a
fashion that picketing, to protest discriminatory hiring policies, was
a protected activity; while the request for a concrete remedy to that
discriminatory policy in the form of a specific number of persons to be
hired was a violation of that requirement and was to be proscribed. For
those persons who had been discriminated against for long periods of
time this was not being color-blind but rather it was a continuation
of status quo discrimination. This interpretation is analogous to the
long-distance runner who is forced to carry a fifty-pound weight for
the first half of the race and upon being allowed to put the weight down
is told that he is now being treated equally with the other runners in that
now none of them is carrying weights. The fact that the other runners
had the advantage of being without the additional weight from the start
and are now far ahead of the runner who carried the weight is apparent.
The question is, is he being treated equally by no longer requiring him to
carry the weight even though he is behind everyone else in the race
as a result of it, or can he be given equal treatment only by moving him
forward to catch up with the other participants in the race? The latter
of course is what the West Side Organization was asking for in its request
for a specific number of Negroes to be hired as drivers.
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego Chapter of CORE,74
CORE had been prohibited by a preliminary injunction from exhibiting
signs stating that the public utility discriminated in its hiring policies
because it did not employ a certain percentage of Negroes. The utility
contended that CORE was asking for proportionate hiring because in its
negotiations, CORE pointed out that among the utility's work force only
70 Id. at 411,204 N.E. 2d at 594.
71 Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization, 34 Ill.2d 257, 215 N.E. 2d 443
(1966).
72 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, H§ 851-66 (1963).
73 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 200e-2(a) (1964).
74 241 Cal. App. 2d 405, 50 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1966).
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one per cent were Negroes while seven per cent of the population of the
area were Negroes. CORE countered that the percentage analysis was
simply the basis of their contention that the utility was unfair to Negroes
in its hiring policies and not a demand for quota hiring. The court found
no evidence of a demand for quota hiring by the pickets either through
signs or utterances. The signs they carried read: "End Discrimination,"
"Don't Fire, Just Hire," "Not More, Not Less, But Equal," "Give Us A
Chance to Learn in Your Training Program," and "Count the Results!
S. D. Gas & Elec. Co. is an Equal Opportunity Employer?" 5
In a concurring opinion, Judge Coughlin stated that limiting the
injunction, by a removal of the restrictions placed upon the language that
could be used in the signs carried by the pickets, was not an authorization
to demand quota hiring. He went on to say that:
Where the object of picketing is unlawful, the picketing is unlawful
and may be enjoined. Quota hiring based on race, creed or color
is unlawful. An employer who is required to hire a designated
percentage of his employees only because they are persons of a
particular race, creed, or color, and perforce is requird to refuse
to hire those of another race, creed, or color in order that he may
employ the former, is required to discriminate against those he
refuses to employ because they are not of the race, creed or color
included within the percentage hiring classification. 76
The converse of this viewpoint is that if one hires persons only of
a particular race, creed or color this is in effect a refusal to hire those
persons of another race, creed or color. It would seem then, that the fact
that only one per cent of the work force was made up of persons of a
particular race, while seven per cent of the population of the area, and
presumably the same percentage of the overall work force of the area,
were of this race, would be an indication of at least past discriminatory
policies. If we assume that the employer's present hiring policies and
practices are racially neutral or "color-blind" on their face, and they tend
to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, then it would seem that
they would still be unlawful. This is true if persons who are already
employed are presently affected by past racial discrimination 77 and it
would seem that by analogy, at least, it would also apply to potential
employees as well. Discrimination in hiring policies often times is subtle
or even unconscious. The policy of giving preference in the hiring of
employees to persons who are referred to the company by a friend
or relative is an example of unconscious discrimination. The Eighth
75 Id. at 408, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
76 Id. (concurring opinion).
77 United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970); Griggs v. DukePower Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 926 (1970); UnitedStates v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 327 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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Circuit in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,78 found this type
of unconscious discrimination in the telephone company's hiring policies.
The company's recruitment policy,... which depended primarily
upon existing employees to refer new prospects for employment,
operated to discriminate against blacks... with an almost completely
white work force, it is hardly surprising that such a system of
recruitment produced few, if any, black applicants. As might be
expected, existing white employees tended to recommend their own
relatives, friends and neighbors, who would likely be of the same
race. Where Title VII has been violated, courts may prohibit or
change policies which appear racially neutral on their face but build
upon pre-Title VII bias that produces present discrimination. 79
If, for example, 95 per cent of the company's present personnel are
white and only 5 per cent are Negro, even though the company would
hire a Negro who was referred by a friend or relative just as it would hire
a white person who was referred, it is still discrimination against those
persons who have no friends or relatives employed by the company and
simply walk in seeking employment. If a large percentage of the minority
persons who apply for jobs are walk-in applicants, then this policy has
the effect of discriminating against them.8"
In 1967, the Georgia Supreme Court, in the case of Williams v.
Maloof,8' concluded that the trial court did not err in granting a
temporary injunction against the picketing of retail store that refused
to give information as to whether it had a policy of equal employment and
equal promotion opportunities for Negroes. The court held that there was
no evidence of any right being exercised by these Negroes which could
justify the interference with the plaintiff's business.82 In the one-page
opinion, which does not cite the New Negro Alliance case, there is no
evidence that the picketers were asking for quota hiring. It is difficult
to understand why the observation of discrimination in a store and the
protesting of that discrimination by picketing is lawful, while picketing
that arises as a result of a refusal to cooperate in determining whether
discrimination exists, which in itself is an indication of discriminatory
practices, would be unlawful.
78 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Parham].
79 Id. at 426-7; accord, United States v. Dillon Supply Co. 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.
1970); Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 399 U.S.
926 (1970); United States v. Local 36, AFL-CIO, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
Local 189, AFL-CIO v. United States 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1970); Local 53, Intl. Assn. of Heat and Frost Insulators v. Vogler. 407
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp.
977 (W.D. N.Y. 1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968).
80 Caminez, Racial Discrimination in Employment, 45 FLA. B.J. 640, 641 (1971).
81223 Ga. 640, 157 S.E.2d 479 (1967).
82 Id.
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As recently as 1971, in Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. Adolph
Coors Corp.,'3 the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had attempted to
demonstrate that an employer who did not have minority persons
employed in numbers equal to the percentage which these people
constituted within the labor market, was guilty of discrimination, by
alleging that this was an indication of discrimination per se. The issue
in that case was not that of discrimination but rather a collateral issue of
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's subpoena power. The Commission
issued a complaint against the defendant corporation which was not
resolved by conference, and ordered a hearing and issued a subpoena
duces tecum, ordering the company to make available certain documents.
One of the bases for the complaint was that the corporation had "not
hired nor promoted employees of minority races on a quota basis which
would be proportionate to their percentage position within the over-all
labor market." 84 The Court did not discuss the issue of whether or not the
use of the quota by the Commission was legal, since the issue involved
was that of the Commission's power to subpoena under the Colorado
Anti-discrimination Act of 1957.8 The Court did say, however, that the
objections set out by the Commission in the complaint (including
the failure to hire on a quota basis) did not point to any particular act or
omission to act on the part of the defendant corporation that would
represent an unfair or discriminatory act under the statute. 8 Thus the
Colorado Court held that the failure to hire minority employees in
a number proportionate to the over-all labor market is not in and of itself
an indication of discrimination. The Court said that this kind of indication
of discrimination was too indefinite and general and could not form the
basis for any legal proceedings. However, the Fifth Circuit in Alabama
v. United States87 has stated that where racial discrimination was at issue
"statistics often tell much, and Courts listen." The Eighth Circuit also
held in the Parham case that statistics could be used as an indication of
discrimination. "We hold as a matter of law that these statistics, which
revealed an extraordinarily small number of black employees, except
for the most part as menial laborers, established a violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 88
The court in the Parham case took judicial notice of the fact that
21.9 per cent of Arkansas' 1960 population was Negro.
83 29 Colo. App. 240, 486 P.2d 43 (1971).
84 Id. at ...... 486 P.2d at 45.
85COLO. REv. STAT. § 80-21-6 (1, 2) (1963).
86 29 Colo. App. at ....... 486 P.2d at 46.
87 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
88 Parham, 443 F.2d at 426.
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In Carter v. Gallagher,89 a class action instituted against the Civil
Service Commission of Minneapolis on the basis of discriminatory
practices in the hiring of firemen for the city, the federal district court 9
held that the Civil Service Commission's procedure denied blacks
the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
and violated their section 1981 right of freedom from discrimination in
employment because of race. In fashioning a remedy, the trial court
granted affirmative relief in the form of an absolute preference in fire
department employment to 20 minority applicants who met the qualifica-
tions.9 1 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, a three-judge panel modified the
holding of the trial court. The trial court's determination of past racial
discrimination and the plan laid down by the court to insure that the
discrimination had been eliminated in the filling of future positions was
approved by the panel. However, that portion of the decree giving an
absolute preference to twenty applicants was reversed, on the basis that
an absolute preference in employment to minority applicants over whitn
applicants with superior qualifications was discrimination in reverse
against the white applicants in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment and section 1981 of Title 42.92 The court
supported its view on the basis that the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.93 had held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
not require an applicant be hired simply because he was a member of a
minority group which had been previously discriminated against. The
Supreme Court stated: "[D]iscriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed." The court in Carter read section 1981 and the fourteenth
amendment as proscribing any discrimination in employment based on
race, whether it be discrimination against whites or blacks. 95 The court
stated that the fact that past discrimination had existed against minorities
was not justification for present discrimination against better qualified
white applicants. The court adopted the view that if the qualifications
89452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (Modified on rehearing en banc 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Carter].
90 The district court decree, which was not reported, was entered on March 9, 1971.
Id. at 318.
91 The trial court order read, in part, as follows:
That the defendants herein... give absolute preference in certification as fire
fighters with the Minneapolis Fire Department to twenty (20) Black, American-
Indian, or Spanish-Surnamed-American applicants for fire fighter who qualify
for such positions on the basis of the examinations given pursuant to the
Minneapolis Civil Service Commission fire fighter examination... and who meet
the requirements of said examination....
Id.
92 Id. at 325.
93 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
94 Id. at 430-31.
95 452 F.2d at 325.
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required for the job are fairly established, then, to give a minoritypreference was to "visit the sins of the father upon the sons." The court
refused to recognize the possibility that past discriminations of all types,
might be a factor affecting the qualifications of minority persons generally.
On rehearing en banc the court modified the holding of thethree-judge panel by reversing that portion relating to preferential hiring.96The issue on the rehearing was limited to a determination of the
appropriateness of the remedy ordered by the trial court. The court
pointed out that in giving an absolute preference the trial court had gonefurther than any appellate court in granting a preference to overcome the
effects of past discrimination and that the absolute preference did appear
to violate the equal protection rights of whites who were better qualified
for the jobs.97 The court then pointed out that the Supreme Court inLouisiana v. United States9" had held that there was an affirmative duty
to eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past actions as well as toprohibit discrimination in the future.99 The court observed that there was
wide power in the trial court, sitting as a court of equity to fashion
a remedy to enforce the Civil Rights Acts and the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, including the power to eradicate the effects
of past discrimination.'0 They pointed out that the anti-preferential
treatment section of Title VII 0 did not apply in this case since this action
was not predicated upon that statute but under section 1981 and thefourteenth amendment. The court stated, however, that even the anti-
preferential treatment section of Title VII did not limit the court's power
to order affirmative relief to correct the effects of past discrimination. Inlooking for guidelines to shape a remedy the court observed that other
courts had: required unions to recruit sufficient blacks to make up a givenpercentage of the membership in the union's apprenticeship programs;102
ordered unions to alternate white and black referrals; 0 3 required a motor
carrier to hire a given number of Negroes as drivers on an alternating
ratio of one Negro for each white;104 upheld the Philadelphia Plan which
required the establishing of percentage goals for the employment of
minority workers.105 The court pointed out that none of these remedies
96 Id. at 327. The decision was 7-2.
97 Id. at 328.
98 380 U.S. 145 (1964).
99 Id. at 154.
100 452 F.2d at 329.
101 § 703(j) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See supra note 64.
102 United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 447 (1971).
103 Cases cited supra note 63.
104 United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
105 Contractors Assn. of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 92 S. Ct. 98 (1971).
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required an absolute preference to minority persons for the first vacancies
available in contrast to the remedy of the trial court in Carter which
granted an absolute preference. The court reaffirmed the panel's conten-
tion that an absolute preference would operate as a denial of equal
protection to whites who were equally or better qualified for the positions
sought. At the same time, they acknowledged the need to eliminate the
effect of past discrimination. In order to accommodate these two consider-
ations, which the court considered conflicting in results, they arrived at a
remedy which the court seems to characterize as a compromise. This
remedy was to institute a ratio for hiring minority persons who were
qualified under the qualification standards approved by the court. This
ratio was set at one minority person for every two non-minority persons
hired by the fire department. The ratio was to be in effect until there was
a fair approximation of minority representation to the population mix of
the area. The court accepted the trial court's determination of twenty as
meeting this proportionate representation. In answer to the contention
that this remedy would be establishing an illegal quota the court explained:
Such a procedure does not constitute a "quota" system because as
soon as the trial court's order is fully implemented, all hirings will
be on a racially nondiscriminatory basis, and it could well be that
many more minority persons or less, as compared to the population
at large, over a long period of time would apply and qualify for
the positions. However, as a method of presently eliminating the
effects of past racial discriminatory practices and in making mean-
ingful in the immediate future the constitutional guarantees against
racial discrimination, more than a token representation should be
afforded. For these reasons we believe the trial court is possessed
of the authority to order the hiring of 20 qualified minority persons,
but this should be done without denying the constitutional rights of
others by granting an absolute preference. 10 6
The court concluded its opinion by outlining the considerations it
had been guided by in fashioning its remedy in this particular case. These
considerations were as follows: the Supreme Court's approval of the use
of mathematical ratios as "a starting point in the process of shaping a
remedy";10 7 the reluctance of minority persons to apply for employment,
because of their knowledge of the past discriminatory hiring practices
of the fire department, without some positive assurance that they
would be hired on something more than a token basis; the speculative
nature of the ability of the qualifying test to rank qualified applicants, in
the order of their degree of qualification, as well as to separate the
qualified from the unqualified; and the minority representation in
the over-all population mix of the area.108
106 452 F.2d at 330-331.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 331.
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Two of the judges dissented on the basis that the court's minority
preference provision was still discriminatory against white applicants
whose qualifications are superior to those who are employed under
the proposed ratio. 109
The Eighth Circuit has, in the Carter case, attempted to draw
a distinction between those proportionate hiring procedures which
establish a quota and thus, are illegal, and those which do not, and are
therefore legal. The difference between the two seems 'to 'be that the
court's remedy is temporary 
-in nature, in that once the twenty minority
persons are hired to make up for the past discriminatory practices
of the fire department, then, all future hirings will be on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis. Thus, once minority persons have had a chance
to "catch up" they will compete equally with whites and the number of
minority persons employed by the fire department could then be either
greater or smaller than their proportionate numbers in the population
at large. This infers then, that the absolute preference of twenty positions
for minority persons in the fire department, as established by the trial
court, has some other effect. It is true that the trial court's remedy would
have given the first twenty vacancies to qualified minority persons while
the Eighth Circuit's remedy spreads this out over the first sixty vacancies
on a one out of three ratio. The effect of this would be that whites are
not completely excluded from consideration for the first twenty vacancies.
However, as critics of the quota approach will point out, of the first sixty
vacancies to be filled, it is theoretically possible for better "paper"
qualified whites to be discriminated against. This descrimination isjustified by the court in that it will eliminate the effects of past racial
discrimination and give the fire department the approximate number of
minority persons it would have had but for the discriminatory practices.
Therefore, the court has reasoned, since this eliminates the effects of past
illegal practices it is legal. The student of the judicial reasoning process
will, I suspect, be able to understand the court's reasoning process. It is
not our purpose to delve into that topic. It is the man on the street,
however, both black and white, who will be troubled by the court's
reasoning process. In all of the cases we have discussed in this article,
where a request to hire a given number of minority persons has been
made, the reason for such a request has been to correct the effects of
past racial discriminatory practices. It has never been suggested in any
of these cases that once the minority group achieved that proportional
number then all other members of the group would be excluded from
consideration for employment until there was an opening within the
quota. The idea of quotas or proportional hiring has always been to make
up for past practices. It would seem then, to this writer, that a better
solution would be for the court to admit what it is doing in straightforward
109 Id. at 332 (dissenting opinion).
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way and simply state that quotas, based on ratios in hiring, which will
reflect a reasonable approximation of the minority representation in the
population, is a constitutional necessity to eliminate the effects of past
racial discrimination. To put it in the layman's language, let the court
call a spade a spade. The Carter court has gone further than any appellate
court in the country in establishing quotas. Let us hope that the next
appellate court to consider the question will take the next step and
recognize the quota for what it is, a constitutional necessity to eliminate
the effects of these illegal past practices.
V. QUOTAS OR GOALS? EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246
Up to this point this article has dealt with the attempts of private
groups and individuals to deal with the problems of employment
discrimination through whatever private means they had at their command
(primarily the picket and quota demands). Now let us explore how
government, primarily the federal government, has come into the picture
and what solutions it is offering.
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 devoting an entire
title to job discrimination and employment practices110 and Presidential
Executive Order No. 11,246,111 the federal government decided that it
could introduce a plan to deal with the problem of minority employment,
at least on federally funded construction projects. 11 2 The plan required
that contractors take affirmative action to ensure that minority applicants
were employed upon these federally funded projects.
One of the first courts to hear the merits of such a plan held that
it was constitutionally valid.113 The case arose in Ohio in a taxpayer's
action to enjoin a county community college board from awarding a
construction contract to any but the lowest bidder. The college had
1042 U.S.C. 1 2000 (e) (1964).
n- Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), reaffirmed in, Exec. Order No.
11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969).
112Section 202 (1) of Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), is directed at
all governmental contractors and provides:
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated equally during employment, without regard to their race,
creed, color, or national origin. Such action shall include but not be limited to
the following: employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment
or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of
compensation; and selection for training; including apprenticeship.
For the background of Executive Order No. 11,246 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 see Herbert and Reischel, Title VII and The Multiple Approaches to
Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1971); Note,
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv.
L. REv. 1109 (1971).
113 Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E. 2d 907
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
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purchased the land from the City of Cleveland under an agreement
that all construction would be done under the requirements of the federal
government, including the requirement of setting up bidding practices
and providing for affirmative action to assure equal opportunity in
employment.1 14 The low bidder had submitted an Affirmative Action Plan
including a "manning table" showing the number of minority persons who
would be on the job by month and year. However, this plan made equality
in hiring subject to availability, and dependent on referral of all labor
from the union. 115 The union local that supplied this contractor with labor
had between 1500 and 1600 white members and six Negro apprentices.- 6
The bid was rejected by the college because of the language used by
the contractor in his plan. The college contended and the court agreed
that the "if available" provision negated the provision to assure
non-discrimination against minorities. The trial court stated that the use
of the phrase "if available" poisoned the very purpose of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act and Executive Order No. 11,246.117 The court stated:
There has... come a time when firmness must be used against all
who do not feel able or inclined to cooperate in the equal
employment effort. The statute and the Executive Order imple-
menting it are in the Court's opinion in full keeping with the
constitutional guarantee of the rights of all citizens.,'
The court pointed out that the college had not prescribed any ratio
between white and minority group employees, nor had it required bidders
to guarantee to maintain a ratio quota system. The trial court stated that
the evidence failed to show that the college or any federal officer had
required "preferential treatment for any individual or any group for the
purpose of achieving racial balance."" 9 The Ohio Supreme Court in
affirming 120 the trial court's decision stated that the issue was whether
or not the "policies of the United States and the State of Ohio against
114 Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 238 N.E. 2d
839 (C.P. 1968).
115 The final submission of Reliance Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (the low bidder)
stated: "This company will continue to make every reasonable effort to see to it thatNegro apprentices are employed and placed on this project. However, this company
cannot and, therefore, does not guarantee that it will have Negro apprentices on the
project." The contract was then awarded to the second low bidder whose assurance
of equal employment opportunity and minority group representation on the job was
expressed in its statement: "You are hereby advised that we will have Negro
representation in all crafts employed on this project." 19 Ohio SL 2d at 36, 249
N.E.2d at 909.
116 15 Ohio Misc. at 291, 238 N.E.2d at 841.
17 Id. at 295-96, 238 N.E.2d at 843.
118 Id. at 297, 238 N.E.2d at 844.
119 Id. at 298, 238 N.E.2d at 845.
120Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d907 (1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1004 (1970). The vote in favor of the college
was 5-2.
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discriminatory employment practices may be positively enforced by
a public body through the medium of improvement contracts."' 121 In
holding that the policies could be so enforced, the court pointed out that
neither a guarantee of Negro employment or quotas for the employment
of minorities was required or sought. To do so, the court stated, would be
a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That the successful bidder
had, in fact, pledged Negro representation on the job did not show such
a violation since there was no evidence that its pledge was either required
or solicited.122 All that was sought from the successful bidder was an
unequivocal statement that would assure equal employment opportunity,
while the low bidder refused to make anything more than equivocal
assurances. The difference was that of saying, "I will try to have
minority persons on the job," and saying "I will try to have minority
persons on the job if the union supplies them to me."
In 1969 the Department of Labor issued a regulation pursuant to
Executive Order No. 11,246 which was entitled "The Revised Philadelphia
Plan." 123 The Plan covered six construction trades124 and geographically
applied to the five counties in Pennsylvania in the Philadelphia metropoli-
tan area. In substance, the Plan required that bidders on all construction
contracts in the Philadelphia area, which were subject to Executive Order
No. 11,246, must, in the affirmative action plan they were required to
12 Id. at 37, 249 N.E.2d at 909.
122 Id. at 39, 249 N.E.2d at 910.
123 The Philadelphia Plan was originally issued in 1967 in the Department of Labor
Order of Nov. 30. The Plan was suspended by the Labor Department after the
Controller General held that the post-award negotiation violated the competitive
bidding principles by imposing requirements on bidders which were not specifically
set out in the solicitation for bids.
[Tlhere would appear to be a technical defect in an invitation's requirement for
submission of a program subject to Government approval prior to contract
awards which does not include or incorporate definite standards on which
approval or disapproval will be based. We believe that the basic principles of
competitive bidding require that bidders be assured that awards will be made
only on the basis of the low responsive bid submitted by a bidder meeting
established criteria of responsibility, including any additional specific and
definite requirements set forth in the invitation, and that award will not
thereafter be dependent upon the low bidder's ability to successfully negotiate
matters mentioned only vaguely before the bidding.
47 Comp. Gen. 666,670 (1968). The court in the Weiner case disagreed with the
Comptroller General, however, and upheld the Cleveland Plan, which could be
challenged upon the same basis. The Revised Philadelphia Plan was the direct result
of the opposition of the Comptroller General. For a discussion of the Comptroller
General's position see Jones, The Bugaboo oj Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REV.
341, 358-61.
124 Iron workers, plumbers and pipe fitters, steamfitters, sheetmetal workers, electrical
workers, and elevator construction workers.
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submit with their bid, "set specific goals of minority utilization which
meet the definite standard included in the invitation for bids."las
The order was based on Labor Department findings that while the
overall minority group's representation in the entire construction industry
in the Philadelphia metropolitan area was thirty per cent, in the affected
trade unions, representation was approximately one per cent.126 The order
established ranges within which each contractor's minority group
employment goals should be set.1 27 However, these goals are not absolute
requirements. If the contractor meets the goals he will be presumed to be
in compliance with the Plan. If, however, he fails to meet the goals, there
is an opportunity provided for him to show that a good faith effort was
made to meet them. Only if this good faith test is not met will sanctions
be imposed. The Philadelphia Plan contains the provision that in
determining whether a contractor is in compliance with it, the contractor
may not use the excuse that the union which supplies him with labor fails
to refer minority employees.1 28 As a result of this Plan, the Contractors'
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania filed suit charging that the plan was
in conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and was also a violation
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The major thrust of the
Association's contention was that the Plan required "quota" hiring in
that the contractor was forced to hire a definite percentage of minority
employees. The court rejected this argument and stated that the Plan
does not require the hiring of definite percentage, but merely requires
that the contractor make a good faith effort to meet the goals set. The
court stated that, "[i]f a contractor is unable to meet the goal but has
exhibited good faith, then the imposition of sanctions in our opinion
would be improper and subject to judicial review." 129
Judge Weiner set out the public policy argument that supports
a conclusion that the Plan was not inconsistent with the requirements of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Constitution when he stated:
The strength of any society is determined by its ability to open doors
and make its economic opportunities available to all who can
qualify. It is fundamental that civil rights, without economic rights,
are mere shadows. These two rights are not only equal but a must,
125 Contractors Assn. of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (E.D.
Pa. 1970). See also Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46
N.Y.U. L. REv. 225 (1971); Comment, The Affirmative Action Requirement of
Executive Order 11,246 and Its Effect on Government Contractors, Unions and
Minority Workers, 32 MoNT. L. REv. 249 (1971).
126 311 F. Supp. at 1005.
12 These ranges for minority group employment goals are: first year--4 to 9 percent;
second year-9 to 15 percent; third year-14 to 20 percent; fourth year-19 to 26
percent. Id.
128 Id. at 1006.
129 Id. at 1010.
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and when realized will bring into full play that protection to which
our Constitution and statutes are dedicated.
130
Judge Weiner concluded his opinion by saying that it was his belief:
[T]hat the denial of equal employment opportunity must be
eliminated from our society. It is beyond question, that present
employment practices have fostered and perpetuated a system that
has effectively maintained a segregated class. That concept.., is
repugnant, unworthy, and contrary to present national policy. The
Philadelphia Plan will provide an unpolluted breath of fresh air to
ventilate this unpalatable situation. Justice demands an end to all
artifices that prevent one, who because of color is estopped from
enjoying the same opportunities that are accorded to those of
different color. The destiny of minority group employment is the
primary issue and the Philadelphia Plan will provide an equitable
solution to this troublesome problem.
131
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Third Circuit held that the
use of an Executive Order to promulgate the Philadelphia Plan was
valid as being within the implied authority of the President and was not
prohibited by Constitutional or Congressional enactment-
3 2
In speaking of the plaintiff's contention that the Plan violates the
basic prohibitions of Title VII the court said:
To read [Title VII] in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs we
would have to attribute to Congress the intention to freeze the status
quo and to foreclose remedial action undzr other authority designed
to overcome existing evils. We discern no such intention either from
the language of the statute or from its legislative history. Clearly the
Philadelphia Plan is color-conscious. Indeed the only meaning which
can be attributed to the "affirmative action" language... is that
Government contractors must be color-conscious.
13
Comment on the Plan in various law journals 134 has not been all
favorable. Most of the commentors feel that the plan is unworkable
because the labor union and not the contractor is the proper party to be
pressured if minority groups are to be properly represented in Government
construction contracts. The solution offered by the comments does
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1012-13.
132 Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied 92 S.Ct. 98 (1971).
133 Id. at 173. (Emphasis added.)
134 Coleman, The Philadelphia Plan Goes to Washington, 57 A.B.A.J. 135 (1971);
Gosseen and Moss, The Philadelphia Plan: A Critical Analysis, 23 N.Y.U. CONF. ON
LABOR, 169, 204 (1971); Comment, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 662 (1970); Comment,
8 HOUSTON L. REv. 342, 355 (1970). Comment, 47 N.D. L. REV. 123 (1971);
Comment, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 817 (1970); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: Equal
Employment Opportunity in The Construction Trades, 6 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB.
187 (1970); Note, The Philadelphia Plan: Remedial Racial Classification in Employ-
ment, 58 GEo. L.J. 1187 (1970).
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vary, however, from a view that the Plan is the imposition of a quota or
proportional representation system which is contrary to both the
Constitution and Title VII,'13 to the view that strict racial quotas are
constitutionally necessary and permissible.1 36 It is perhaps too early to
evaluate the success of the Philadelphia Plan. There is a great deal
of merit to the contention that a more realistic and meaningful program
could be developed by compelling the trade unions, as well as the
contractors, to adopt the affirmative action plan requirements. 37 As
the Plan developed in its first year, there was little visible difference
in the composition of construction crews that were, 138 in theory at
least, meeting the requirements of the Plan.
While the Philadelphia Plan was in the process of litigation, the
federal district courts of at least two other states were upholding
the validity of the affirmative action plan requirement of Executive Order
No. 11,246. In Joyce v. McCrane,-' the federal district court in New
Jersey held that a state plan which set up goals of 30 per cent to 37 per
cent utilization of minority group employees did not invalidate the
135 Coleman, The Philadelphia Plan Goes to Washington, 57 A.B.A.J. 135, 138 (1971).
136 Racial quotas are a factual necessity to combat the grossly unfair and unequal
employment conditions which exist on Federal construction contracts. They are
also a constitutional necessity. This is true because the Federal Government is
required to eradicate conditions of present and past discrimination in which ithas been involved through past action, and because it cannot now take partin racial discrimination. Past policies of contract issuance have contributed to,
and present "color-blind" policies support, racial discrimination. [Footnotes
omitted.] Thus, an affirmative duty must be imposed on the Government to end
and undo the effects of this discrimination through the only effective means
available, racial quotas....
To rely on the "color-blind" ability test is to acknowledge, accept, andperpetuate acts of past discrimination against the minority worker. Thus, to
compare abilities or experience will result in the non-white being turned away
on the basis of past racial considerations.
Comment, The Philadelphia Plan and Strict Racial Quotas on Federal Contracts, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 817, 832, 834 (1970).
137 Dobbins v. Local 212, I.B.E.W. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968), held the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 applicable to union discrimination. The court concluded,
Membership in and/or a referral status in a union is a contractual relationship
and/or a link in the chain of making a contract. The subject matter is.
therefore, within 42 U.S.C. 1981.At least since Jones v. Mayer, a strictly private right, be it in the property field
as such, or in the contract field as such, is within the protection of the CivilRights Act of 1866 against interference by a private citizen or a group of
citizens. Governmental sanction or participation is no longer a necessary factorin the assertion of a § 1981 action. Even assuming that it is, the extent ofgovernment (Federal, State and local) financing of the activity (building, etc.)in the geographical area, and specifically in the activities in which journeymen
electricians engage, is sufficient in this case (approximately 75%) to answer
the requirement. [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 442. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); and Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268
F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Accord, Todd v Joint Apprenticeship Committee, 223
F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963), remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot
332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1964). But see Gaynor v.
Rockefeller 15 N.Y.2d 120, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 204 N.E.2d 627 (1965); But cf. Waters
v. Paschen Contractors, Inc. 227 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
138 Integration Drive Fails To Overcome, Business Week, June 6, 1970, at 48.
139 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D. N.J. 1970).
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so-called "Newark Plan." Provided that, as with the Philadelphia Plan,
sanctions could not be imposed if the contractor tried in good faith
to meet these goals but was unable to do so.
The State of Illinois, in order to comply with Executive Order
No. 11,246 and the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968,140 developed a
plan 141 whereby unemployed minority group persons would be recruited,
tested, trained and placed in the state's federally aided highway
construction program. The plan was designed to attract minority group
persons from a two-county area in Southern Illinois for training in six
major trades 142 involved in highway construction. The Plan provided for
an initial period of classroom and practical training designed to give the
trainee the basic elements of the craft. After the trainee received these
basic skills he was to be given on-the-job training to develop his skills to
the level of journeyman. To provide this on-the-job training, contractors
were required, under the Plan, to hire trainees at the minimum rate
of one trainee for every four journeymen. In an action for a declaratory
judgment the federal district court held that the agreement did not violate
the Civil Rights Act or the fifth or fourteenth amendments.' 4 In
upholding the Plan and the minimum ratios that it encompasses the
court discussed the public policy justification for such a plan:
There is no doubt that there is a need to eradicate these past evil
effects, and to prevent the continuation in the future of these
discriminatory practices. Inasmuch as such practices have continued
for decades, there is no infallible and certain formula which will
erase decades of history and alter a distasteful set of circumstances
into a utopian atmosphere. Discriminatory practices have taken
place, and something must be done in order to rectify the situation.
Such practices must be eliminated by responsible and responsive
governmental agencies acting pursuant to the best interest of the
community. Basic self interests of the individual must be balanced
with social interests, and in circumstances where blacks have been
discriminated against for years, there is no alternative but to require
that certain minorities be taken into consideration with respect to the
specific minority percentage of the population in a given area in
order to provide a starting point for equal employment opportunities.
In this regard, it is the feeling of this Court that minimum ratios,
where, de jure or de facto, based upon race are constitutional
and valid when adopted for the purpose of implementing affirmative
action to achieve equal employment opportunities.1 44
140P.L. 90-495; 82 Stat. 815.
141 The Ogilvie Plan.
142 "Ironworkers, Cement Masons, Operating Engineers, Laborers, Carpenters, and
Teamsters," see Southern Illinois Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154, 1159
(S.D. Ill. 1971).
143 Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
144 Id. at 1159.
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The court infers without specifically saying, that, as with the
Philadelphia Plan, contractors are to be given an opportunity to show
that they are making a good faith effort to comply with the plan before
any sanctions will be imposed upon them.
VI. WHICH WAY Now?
One cannot help but observe the similarity in the courts' treatment
of the private demand for employment opportunity and their treatment of
the government's Affirmative Action Plans. In the first instance, with the
recent exception of the Carter case, so long as the demand is not couched
in language requiring that a specific number of persons be hired, but is
only a demand for a "reasonable racial balance" then the demand is not
a quota and is valid. The Affirmative Action Plan's goal requirements
have not been characterized as quotas because sanctions have not been
imposed for failure to meet these goals if a good faith effort to do so is
made. We may, therefore, conclude that to make an absolute demand for
a quota is illegal, while that same demand phrased in the language
of reasonableness, either through the "good faith effort" test or a
"reasonable racial balance," is legal. While the logic of this distinction
is almost irresistible to the legal mind, to the Negro in want of a job it
may well be nothing but equivocation. To the Negro this sophistic
reasoning is being carried out at his expense. One commentator has
expressed what well may be the attitude of the majority of American
Negroes. "One man's 'reasonable balance' when reduced to figures
either as a percentage of total workers employed or as a set number...
is another man's quota." 14
To the Negroes who are advocating some form of equitable redress
for their grievances within the framework of our legal system, it is little
comfort to say that a quota or proportional hiring plan violates the
principle of egalitarianism. Professor Charles V. Hamilton stated what
must be considered the crux of the issue to blackAmericans when he wrote:
What black and white America must understand is that egalitarianism
is just a principle and it implies a notion of "color-blindness" which isdeceptive. It must be clear by now that any society which has been
color-conscious all its life to the detriment of a particular group
cannot simply become color-blind and expect that group to compete
on equal terms. 1'
Certainly the National Commission on Civil Disorders was not being
color-blind when it in effect advised a "quota" in its recommendation
14Weiner, supra note 26, at 293.
146 Hamilton, An Advocate of Black Power Defines It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1968,
§ 6 (Magazine), 22, 81.
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that two million new jobs be found in the public and private sectors
within the next three years.'
47
There are times perhaps, when our legal system cannot afford the
luxury of being color-blind. The courts are now recognizing that fact, just
as the Second Circuit recognized it in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency, 14 when Judge Smith stated:
What we have said may require classification by race. That is
something which the Constitution usually forbids, not because
it is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one
which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose
of maintaining racial inequality. Where it is drawn for the purpose of
achieving equality it will be allowed, and to the extent it is necessary
to avoid unequal treatment by race, it will be required.
49
This is not to say that preferential treatment in employment, either
by private employers or by government, is a panacea for the Negroes'
problems in our multi-racial society. As Professor John Kaplan has
pointed out: "There is a certain irony in climaxing a long struggle in the
name of equality by demanding inequality."' 50 The problems raised
by this issue have no easy solution.151 For example, cities that are already
facing financial crises can ill afford the additional burden of higher
building costs brought about by not accepting the lowest bid when the
lowest bidder fails to agree to comply with an affirmative action plan. It
is no answer, however, to say that because the issues raised are difficult,
both pragmatically and philosophically, that nothing can be done.
If our legal and social systems are to survive the continuing crisis
that we face, means must be found within the systems to alleviate the just
grievances of our economically disadvantaged minorities. 52 Until this is
147 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 421-23 (Bantam
ed. 1968).
148 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
149 Id. at 931-32. See also Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 289 U.S. 840
(1967); Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 430 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1970);
Offermanor v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966), afl'd on rehearing en banc,
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
150Kaplan, Equal Justice In An Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 364 (1966).
151 Professor Kaplan concentrates his attention on what he considers three main
questions:
[Flirst, can the government require private employers to prefer Negroes in
hiring; second, to what extent may an employer be permitted to grant prefer-
ential treatment to Negroes if it so desires-especially in a jurisdiction covered
by a fair employment law which prohibits discrimination aganst a job applicant
because of his race; and third, under what conditions may Negroes be granted
preference in public employment.
Id. at 368
152 This includes, of course, not only the Negro who makes up the largest single group
among the disadvantaged, but also the American Indian, the Mexican-American, the
Puerto Rican, and the Appalachian white.
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done, the major social ills that plague us will continue. One thing seems
clear; in dealing with the conflicting interests of different groups within
society we cannot impose ideal standards on one group when we do not
have the power to impose similar standards on the other.15 3 To take the
position that we must be color-blind is in effect doing just this. This
position overlooks the fact that we, as a society, have never been
color-blind. A more realistic approach would be to accept the fact that
society is not color-blind and on that basis attempt to meet the challenge.
The federal government's Affirmative Action Plan for government
contractors is one attempt to meet this challenge. This is admittedly an
experimental program and it is perhaps too early to evaluate its success. It
may well turn out, as its critics predict, that the more effective action
would be against the unions and not the contractors. 154 Certainly the use
of the affirmative action plan is not without precedent. For many years
the federal government has given preference to certain classes of persons.
The "GI Bills" after World War I115 and the Korean War 156 are
examples of job preferences being given to a particular class of persons, in
this case veterans. The purpose of this discriminatory treatment in favor
of the veteran has been to discharge the debt of gratitude owed to those
who serve the nation in times of perils and to provide a means for those
persons to in effect "catch up" with those who did not have their lives
disrupted by military service. The preference given to veterans has
never been considered by the courts as an unlawful form of discrimination
in government employment. 15 7
Certainly a grateful nation owes a debt of gratitude to its men
and women who served it in time of war, but is that debt any greater
than the one it owes those citizens it has allowed to suffer the odious
abuses of racial discrimination? 158
There are other statutory examples of preferences being given in
governmental employment, such preference being based upon race alone,
and not upon prior governmental service. These statutes deal specifically
with preference being given to Amercan Indians in a variety of jobs in
153 Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d at 866, 198 P.2d at 895-96.
154 Supra note 137.
155 Veterans Preference Act of 1944 § 12, 58 Stat. 390, as amended, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 3502 (a) (1967).
156 Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952 § 101 et. seq., 66 Stat. 626 (1952).
157 "[It has always been the congressional policy to grant veterans a preference in
obtaining and keeping government employment...." Schaller v. United States, 288F.2d 700, 703 (Ct. Cl. 1961). "The veterans' preference act was enacted for thepurpose of discharging... the debt of gratitude the public owes to veterans who have
served in the armed services in time of war, by granting them a preference in original
employment and retention thereof in public service. Valentine v. McDonald, 371
Mich. 138, 144, 123 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1963).
158 But see Kaplan, supra note 150, at 371.
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connection with the Indian Service."5 9 One can make the observation that
these racially based preferences have been of little help to the Indian
and have not eliminated the shameful treatment of him. But they do
establish precedent for legislation allowing preferential treatment based
on race.160 This is not to suggest that legislation is necessarily the best
answer, although it should be considered, perhaps in much the same
context as the social welfare legislation of the depression years when
state minimum wage laws for women were held to be valid. In that
time of national crisis, the United States Supreme Court,161 in addition
to upholding the right to set a minimum wage requirement for women in
furtherance of a state policy of protection, stated that:
There is an additional and compelling consideration which recent
economic experience has brought into a strong light. The exploitation
of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to
bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the
denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health
and well-being but casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are
called upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met.
16 2
It is as true today as it was during the depression of the 1930's that
society pays a social cost far greater in terms of higher welfare
costs, crime rates, and lost potential contribution, as a result of racial
discrimination, than it would pay to mount programs to eradicate
such conditions. In balancing the social equities it would seem that, in
the final analysis, we have but one path to follow.
It can be argued that the path has already been legally laid out for
us in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments and the
legislation enacted by Congress to implement them. These Civil War
Amendments were enacted to transform the realities won on the field of
battle into law. They were intended to clear away the remnants of slavery
and the debilitating effects of the "badges" of slavery that remained.
1
'3 In
effect, these amendments were designed to do something special for the
159 These preferences include jobs as interpreters, 4 Stat. 737 (1834), as amended,
25 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1963); assistant matrons and industrial teachers in Indian schools,
30 Stat. 83 (1897), as amended, 25 U.S.C.A. § 274 (1963); clerical, mechanical and
other help on reservations, 23 Stat. 97 (1884), as amended, 25 U.S.C.A. § 46 (1963);
and as herders, teamsters and laborers, 28 Stat. 313 (1894), as amended, 25 U.S.C.A.
§ 44 (1963).
160Section 703(i) of Title VII allows businesses on or near Indian reservations to
adopt hiring policies which give preferences to Indians. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (i) (1964).
See 25 VAND. L. REV. 234, 236 (1972), for a discussion of judicially approved
minority preference programs in employment to correct past discriminatory practices.
161 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
162 Id. at 399. (Emphasis added.)
163 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873).
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Negro. Thus under these amendments and the enacted legislation toimplement them, the courts can develop a stricter set of rules in regard
to racial discrimination than it can against other types of discrimination,
religious for example.164 For many years the courts rejected the notion
that these amendments were designed to aid the Negro. There has,
however, been a return to the idea in recent years as shown by the case of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 165 In that case the plaintiff brought suit
alleging that the defendant had refused to sell him a house for the sole
reason that he was Negro. In reversing the lower court decision for
the defendant, the court held that, "[section] 1982 bans all racial
discrimination, private as well as public in the sale or rental of
property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the
power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." 116
Mr. Justice Stewart, in speaking for the majority, pointed out that
it has long been agreed that:
The Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress not only to outlaw
all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude but also to eradicate
the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and halffree, by securing to all citizens, of every race and color "the
same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens."' 167
He then pointed out that the refusal to sell property to a person
because of his race is one of the badges and incidents of slavery that
Congress is empowered to abolish under the thirteenth amendment. 68 He
makes a comparison of the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War
as a substitute for slavery with today's exclusion of Negroes from white
neighborhoods as a further refinement and a substitute for the BlackCodes. Just as the Black Codes are relics of slavery, so too is the
refusal to sell property to one on the basis of his race.16
The court, in Jones, for the first time barred purely private racial
discrimination without the sanction of state law. They did so by finding
constitutional authority for congressional action in the area of Negro
164 Justice Stewart points out in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
that section 1982 deals only with racial discrimination and not with other types such
as religious or national origin. Id. at 413.
165 392 U.S. 409 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones].
166 Id. at 413.
167 Id. at 441 n. 78 (quoting from The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22).
168 Id. at 439.
169 Id. at 442-43.
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rights in the power created by the thirteenth amendment "to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery
in the United States."' 170 Congressional action took the form of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 which was enacted to implement that amendment.'7
The court in Jones applied the Act only to private land developers
on the basis of the facts involved. However, by their use of the legislative
history, the court could have logically extended the Act still further 172 and
have abolished all private discrimination in the areas covered by the
Act. 173 Certainly the rationale that was used in the Jones case could be
applied to employment discrimination on the basis that section 1981's
protection of the right to make and enforce contracts would cover
employment contracts. There is considerable evidence that the drafters
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 believed that the Act insured to
Negroes the right to an "equal opportunity to bargain for their labors."'
17 4
This contention has been accepted by !the courts since the Jones decision.
In Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co.'7 5 the defendant
contended that section 1981 did not apply to the employment situation.
The court, in refusing to accept this contention, stated:
In the context of the Reconstruction it would be hard to imagine
to what contract right the Congress was more likely to have been
referring. Certainly the recently emancipated slaves had little or
nothing other than their personal services about which to contract. If
such contracts were not included, what was? Certainly the situation
of former slaves with respect to their labor was a matter of grave
concern in the Congress when the 1866 Act was passed. 76 .
170 Id. at 439 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (emphasis added by
the Jones court). See also Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom
Revisited: Some First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company 22 RuTGERS
L. REv. 537, 538-39 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kinoy].
l1 Ex parte Riggins, 134 F. 404 (5th Cir), rev'd on other grounds, 199 U.S. 547
(1904).
172Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer, 55 VA. L. REv. 272-300 (1969).
173 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is now embodied in 42 U.S.C.A. sections 1981, 1982
(1970). The pertinent language in section 1981 is: "All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,... as is enjoyed by white
citizens ... " Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right.. . as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold
and convey real and personal property."
174 Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 36 U..CH. L. REv. 615, 619 (1969).
175438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
176 Id. at 760; Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
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There is a public policy justification for applying the Jones case
rationale to employment discrimination cases. First, the Negro is our
largest minority group. To alleviate the discrimination in employment
against him would go a long way in alleviating a large percentage of all
discrimination in this area. Secondly, the Negro is the one minority group
that has shown the greatest tendency to become disillusioned about ever
becoming full-fledged citizens. 77 A Negro separatist movement 78 is a
possibility our society must face. If the disparity in income between blacks
and whites in this country is not attacked in one way, it is apt to be
attacked in another. At the very least, failure to reduce the gap will
probably lead to more unrest, particularly among ghetto youth.
VII. CONCLUSION
To say that the issue of preferential treatment for Negroes is complex
is an understatement of the first magnitude. It is more akin to the fabled
Gordian knot. The issue raises more difficult, practical, and moral
problems than any other issue facing us today. But face it we must, for
the social and moral consequences of not facing it are even greater. There
is perhaps no way to loosen the knot. If that is the case, then we must cut
through it with new solutions, one of which may be the technique used by
the Supreme Court in the Jones case. Another possible approach is that
taken by the Eighth Circuit in Carter and allow temporary quotas for the
purpose of allowing Negroes to catch up to where they would have been
but for the past discriminatory treatment. One should not expect to find
easy solutions within our legal system. These are problems that grew out of
three hundred years of immorality, immorality that for most of that time
has had the sanction of law behind it and has been firmly planted in our
moral code. Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Jones points
out how that immorality has affected the white man as well as the black.
The true curse of slavery is not what it did to the black man, but
what it has done to the white man. For the existence of the institution
produced the notion that the white man was of superior character,intelligence, and morality.... Some badges of slavery remain
today. While the institution has been outlawed, it has remained
in the minds and hearts of many white men. 79
177 See generally Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders(1968).
178 Johnson, Black Assembly Voted at Parley, N.Y. Times, March 13, 1972, 1 1, at 1,
col. 7.
179 392 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring opinion).
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The executive, legislative and judicial branches of government'o
must meet the constitutional obligations required of them to remove all
the remaining remnants of chattel slavery.181 However, until the ingrained
racial attitudes of white Americans change and discrimination becomes
immoral and offensive to the vast majority of our citizens, government
may be able to do no more than ease the problem somewhat at the
critical pressure points. Perhaps the most important role that the legal
system can serve at this time is to create a legal climate in which racial
discrimination does become immoral.
180 The statute [section 1982] under present judicial development, depends entirely
on private enforcement. Although damages may be available, in many cases
there may be no damages or the damages are difficult to prove. To ensure that
individual litigants are willing to act as 'private attorneys general' to effectuate
the public purposes of the statute, attorney's fees should be available....
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1971).
181 Kinoy, supra note 170, at 542.
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